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QUO VADIS, ASSOCIATION IN FACT? THE
GROWING DISPARITY BETWEEN HOW
FEDERAL COURTS INTERPRET RICO'S
ENTERPRISE PROVISION IN CRIMINAL
AND CIVIL CASES (WITH A LITTLE STATUTORY
BACKGROUND TO EXPLAIN WHY)
PaulEdgar Harold*
INTRODUCTION

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act' is a
notoriously broad criminal and civil statute, capable of reaching diverse areas of unlawful activity. Highly abstract, the core idea of what
activity the statute reaches is straightforward: the statute prohibits a
person from committing a series of criminal acts (in the statute's
terms, "a pattern of racketeering activity") that have a relationship in
some way to an "enterprise." This amorphous term, "enterprise," covers a wide assortment of varied real-world factual entities-from corporations 2 to street gangs 3 to Mafia families 4 to government
entities 5-and the flexibility of the enterprise concept forms a large
part of RICO's genius.
Federal courts, however, are challenging the heart of the enterprise concept's flexibility. Since the inception of RICO, they have especially attempted to curtail the reach of the "association-in-fact
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., Franciscan
University of Steubenville, 2002. The author would like to thank Professor G. Robert
Blakey, as without his continual help and advice this paper would never have become
publishable. The author would also especially like to thank his beautiful wife for her
constant love and patience during the long writing process.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
2 See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), reh'g en banc, 710 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir. 1983).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2001).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1994).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1984).
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enterprise," the element of the enterprise concept that gives RICO
such variety in application. 6 Currently, federal courts evidence the judicial hostility to civil RICO in particular7 through tightening their
interpretation of what constitutes an association-in-fact enterprise in
the civil context, while concurrently unduly loosening the previous
restrictions on criminal association-in-fact enterprises. The reason for
this federal phenomenon is simple, really. It stems from the "organized crime myth"8 that Congress passed RICO with only the mob in
mind. One eminent jurist described the underlying reason behind
the judicial distaste for civil RICO and the concomitant restrictions on
civil association-in-fact enterprises simply as "a weapon envisioned as a
rifle to shoot mobsters became a shotgun pointed at everybody."9 As
this Note will demonstrate, however, this myth simply is not true.1 0
Thus, many of these restrictions upon civil association-in-fact enterprises amount to judicial activism, albeit a form of activism that has
the interests ofjudicial efficiency and economy rather than individual
rights in mind.
The importance of the reinvigorated restrictions federal courts
impose against civil association-in-fact enterprises are highlighted by a
brief historical introduction. A hypothetical helps to illustrate the various twists and turns that litigation in civil RICO cases has taken due
in part to both recalcitrant judges attempting to restrict civil RICO
actions in order to clear their dockets and plaintiffs' lawyers attempting to elude those restrictions. Suppose a person became outraged
when she learned that a corporation was intentionally committing
6 See, e.g., United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.3d 647, 663 (8th Cir. 1982) (creating
restrictions on association-in-fact enterprises in order to limit the focus of RICO to
"organized crime-like" cases); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1369 (8th
Cir. 1980) (construing the association-in-fact enterprise provision narrowly).
7 Judge Sentelle's 1990 article provides an important study of this prevalent
trend. According to Judge Sentelle:
The ChiefJustice of the United States may well have been speaking for all of
us [judges] in an piece he wrote for The Wall Street Journal. The title of that
piece may say it all: "Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom." OtherJustices
have expressed similar sentiments in more formal writing, specifically opinions, especially separate opinions.

Honorable David B. Sentelle, Civil RICO: TheJudges' Perspective, and Some Notes on Practice for North CarolinaLawyers, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 145, 146 (1990).
8 See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposalsfor Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End
of RICO, " 43 VAND. L. REv. 851, 860-68 (1990) ("Legally, at least, the Organized
Crime Myth ought to be left in its coffin with a stake driven through its heart.").
9 Id. at 150.
10 See infra Part II.B.
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fraud by adding a small illegal fee to every transaction it completed
with a customer when it mailed out its bill." Being a "red-blooded
American,"' 2 she immediately initiated a civil class action suit against
the corporation. To really teach these white collar corporate
criminals a lesson, she added a civil RICO count in the complaint
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) -seemingly the most logical RICO section-which prohibits "any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise ...

to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the

conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity."' 3 She alleged that the corporation conducted this pattern of

mail fraud and should be held liable for treble damages. 14 A federal
judge hearing the case, however, would be quick to apply the first
weapon in his arsenal to promptly get this kind of case off his docket:
the "Person-Enterprise Rule." Using this well established doctrine, all
the judge would need to do would be to state that no RICO enterprise
existed in this case, since "a corporate entity may not be both the
RICO person and the RICO enterprise under § 1962(c)." 15 Because
the plaintiff named the corporation as a defendant in the RICO suit,
the corporation is considered the RICO "person," and therefore the
person-enterprise rule applies. 16 The judge would justify the application of this rule by appealing to congressional intent, arguing that
11 The facts in Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (5th Cir. 1978),
demonstrate that this is not such a "hypothetical" example.
12 Notre Dame Law Professor Joseph Bauer is known among his students for using this phrase to describe the real or imagined heightened propensity of Americans
to resort to lawsuits.

13

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).

14

See id. § 1964(c) ("Any person injured in his business or property by reason of

a violation of section 1962 ... may sue . . .in any appropriate United States district

court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee . .

").

15 Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 344
(2d Cir. 1994); seePuckettv. Tenn. Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1489 (6th Cir. 1989);
Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc., 802 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v. Am.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam,
473 U.S. 606 (1985); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Computer Scis. Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982); Bennet v. Berg,
685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982). But see United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961,
988-90 (l1th Cir. 1982), overruled by United States v. Goldin Indus., 219 F.3d 1268
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that requiring "person" to be separate from "enterprise"
would permit a corrupt corporation to evade punishment, and therefore declining to
follow the person-enterprise rule).
16 For the rule that courts find the RICO "person" in a civil or criminal RICO
action to be whomever the plaintiff names as defendants, see, for example, Delta Truck
& Tractor,Inc. v.J.L Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1988).
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Congress only meant to punish the infiltration of criminals, not the
17
corporation.
With this avenue resoundingly blocked, our plucky plaintiff next
could try what plaintiffs' attorneys historically tried after federal courts
closed the § 1962(c) door: sue under a different section of RICO.18
Tantalized by some quips from courts suggesting that there was another way, a9 she sues under § 1962(a), which prohibits "any person
who has received any income derived ...from a pattern of racketeering activity. . . to use or invest.., any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment of operation of, any enterprise ... ."20 She knows that
courts do not apply the person-enterprise rule to actions brought
under § 1962(a) or § 1962(b), 21 so she would not face that previous
difficulty. Our plaintiff would allege that the corporation's conduct
constituted a pattern of racketeering and that the corporation then
invested the proceeds from racketeering in the enterprise. She would
also allege that she suffered injury from the predicate mail fraud, but
not from the investment of the proceeds of the mail fraud. Again,
however, our plaintiff would run into trouble, as the federal judge has
another trick up his sleeve: the "investment-injury rule." The judge
would be able to invoke this rule, stating that a plaintiff must allege
injury arising from the corporation's investment of the racketeering income in an enterprise in a claim for civil damages under § 1962(a),22
17 See, e.g., B.F. Hirsch, 751 F.2d at 634 ("It is in keeping with that Congressional
scheme to orient section 1962(c) toward punishing the infiltrating criminals rather
than the legitimate corporation which might be an innocent victim of the racketeering activity in some circumstances.").
18 See Patrick D. Hughes, Comment, The Investment Injury Requirement in Civil
RICO Section 1962(a) Actions, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 475, 491-93 (1992) (tracing the history of the switch from § 1962(c) claims to § 1962(a) claims and pinning responsibility for the switch on the person-enterprise rule).
19 See B.F. Hirsch, 751 F.2d at 633-34 (noting that other circuits suggested that an
enterprise could be charged under § 1962(a) and remanding to the district court on
that issue); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401-02 (qualifying its adoption of the person-enterprise rule by promising recovery under § 1962(a)); see also Blakey & Perry, supra note
8, at 863 n.29 (noting the qualification of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Haroco that
recovery was available under § 1962(a)).
20 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
21 See Lance Bremer et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations,34 Am.
CRJM. L. REv. 931, 948 n.139 (1997) (citing cases where the court has ruled that
§ 1962(a) and § 1962(b) are exempt from the application of the person-enterprise
rule).
22 See Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 437 (9th
Cir. 1992); Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1990); Rose v. Bartle,
871 F.2d 331, 356-58 (3d Cir. 1989); Grider v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147,
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to dismiss our plaintiff's case. According to the judge, a violation of
§ 1962(a) would only occur with the actual use or investment of the
23 Since
ill-gotten gain, and not the acts of racketeering themselves.
our plaintiff had not alleged this in her case (indeed, this would be
something very difficult for her to allege given the hypothetical facts
of her case-a difficulty that stymies many would-be RICO plaintiffs),
she was plain out of luck on this tack.
How would our persevering plaintiff proceed given her last two
failures? Historically, the next step in the development of RICO litigation was for plaintiffs to take a second crack at § 1962(c), but this time
the plaintiffs would plead the enterprise differently. Instead of pleading just the corporation as the enterprise, the plaintiffs would allege
in their complaints an "association-in-fact" enterprise. Sometimes
plaintiffs would allege that the association-in-fact enterprise consisted
of the corporation and its employees (especially including the officers
who were committing the fraud), sometimes the corporation and its
subsidiaries, and in other cases the corporation and any other corporation or entity that could possibly have been complicit in the
schemes (a bank, for example, if the scheme involved mortgages).
Assuming our plaintiff took this route, at first glance it would
seem that she was in luck. This time, our federal judge-looking at
the precedents which almost unanimously held that the person-enter24
prise rule did not apply to association-in-fact enterprises -would not
1149-51 (10th Cir. 1989). But see Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 836-39
(4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the investment-injury rule, reasoning that the restriction is
not contained in the explicit language of RICO, that such a requirement would be
contrary to RICO's "liberal construction clause," and that the logic of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), and American
NationalBank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (per curiam),
applied equally to § 1962(a) claims and therefore dictated against a special-injury requirement in any civil RICO claim). See generally Hughes, supra note 18 (providing an
in-depth treatment of the pros and cons to the investment-injury rule).
23 See, e.g., Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 82.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Fairchild, 189 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding
that charging defendant Gruber and his associates as defendants and also as the asso-

ciation-in-fact enterprise did not violate the person-enterprise rule); Landry v. Air
Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 901 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that the plaintiff's
association-in-fact enterprise theory, where the collective bargaining association for
the airline pilots and the airline were both part of the enterprise and also the defendants, did not violate the person-enterprise rule, while the enterprise theory consisting
of just the pilots' collective bargaining association as the enterprise did); Atlas Pile
Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995-96 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that
despite two of the corporations comprising part of the alleged association-in-fact being named defendants in the case, the person-enterprise rule was not implicated);
Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1297 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the fact
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be able to apply the person-enterprise rule in the context of this application of § 1962(c) even though the corporation would be the "person" and make up part of the "enterprise." Indeed, one would be
hard pressed to argue otherwise. No one has debated that one of the
main purposes of RICO was to attack organized crime. If the personenterprise rule applied to association-in-fact enterprises, then "it
would preclude the quintessential organized crime prosecution in
which a mobster is prosecuted for conducting the affairs of a Mafia
family of which he is a member." 25 Because a part of the associationin-fact enterprise, namely the mob member, would be named as the
defendant and thus would be the RICO "person," applying the person-enterprise rule would bar the prosecution of this mob member.
Therefore, ourjudge and federal judges in similar situations were
not able to easily get rid of civil RICO cases pleading association-infact enterprises under § 1962(c). Federal judges had to develop new
methods to rid themselves of what they believed to be unmeritorious
civil RICO claims. 26 This Note, then, traces the development of the
new tools that federal judges apply to hinder this new iteration of civil
that the defendant owned 100% of the corporations alleged to constitute the association-in-fact does not prevent the corporations from being separate legal entities,
thereby not implicating the person-enterprise rule). But see United States v. Computer Scis. Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that even with association-in-fact enterprises, the "person" must be distinct from the "enterprise"). At least
one court, however, has applied the person-enterprise rule to an association-in-fact
enterprise when it consists of only two entities, one of which is the defendant. See
Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 206 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that because the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant Henry is "both the RICO person and a member of the
Crowe/Henry association-in-fact," there was not a "sufficient distinction between the
person and the enterprise"); cf. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. Don King, 533
U.S. 158 (2001) (holding that the sole shareholder of a corporation was a person
distinct from the enterprise for purposes of the person-enterprise rule).
25 2 ARTHUR F. MATHEWS ET AL., CIVIL Rico LITIGATION § 6.03[A], at 6-43 (2d ed.
1992).
26 One example of such new methods is the requirement that the RICO association-in-fact enterprise consist of more than just "a corporate defendant associated
with its own employees or agents carrying on the regular affairs of the defendant."
Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, 30 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir.
1994); see also Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v.J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 243 (5th Cir.
1988). Another is the requirement that the RICO association-in-fact enterprise must
comprise more than just a large manufacturing corporation and its subsidiaries and
retail dealers. See Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 178 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999)
("A firm and its employees, or a parent and its subsidiaries, are not an enterprise
separate from the firm itself.") (citations omitted); Brannon v. Boatmen's First Nat'l
Bank of Okla., 153 F.3d 1144, 1147-49 (10th Cir. 1998); Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp.,
116 F.3d 225, 227-28 (7th Cir. 1997). But see United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219
F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that despite overlapping ownership, three
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RICO cases. While developing these new standards for association-infact enterprises to raise the bar on civil RICO cases, federal judges also
must apply these same principles in the criminal context whenever an
association-in-fact enterprise is alleged. This Note demonstrates that
although the phrasing of these new standards sounds the same in
both the criminal and civil contexts, the reality is quite different. A
closer examination of the factual situations in both criminal and civil
RICO cases reveals that the association-in-fact standards in the criminal context have few teeth, while the application of the "same" standards in the civil context have gnashing jaws that bite unwary plaintiffs
with a vengeance.
Part I of this Note begins the discussion of association-in-fact enterprises by taking a brief look at the language and original purpose of
the association-in-fact provision. This Part shows that most of the restrictions federal courts currently apply to association-in-fact enterprises have no basis either in the text of the statute or in the legislative
history. Next, Part II briefly traces the restrictions on association-infact enterprises from their beginnings in cases before United States v.
Turkette,27 the seminal Supreme Court case in this area that should
have closed the door to such restrictions, to their "rebirth" in United
States v. Bledsoe.28 Part II explains the pedigree of many of the restrictions federal courts currently apply in order to give historical context
and aid in their understanding. Finally, Part III demonstrates the
growing dichotomy in the application of the restrictions on association-in-fact enterprises, briefly analyzing the post-Bledsoe criminal
RICO cases that developed the restrictions but did not apply them,
and then showing how courts applied the restrictions in later civil
RICO cases in a manner inconsistent with the earlier criminal cases.
I.

A.

DEBUNKING THE "ORGANIZED CRIME MYrH" OF

RICO

The Statutory Definition of an "Association-in-FactEnterprise"

Many commentators have spilled ink over the "association-in-fact"
enterprise concept. However, before reaching any of the debate it is
important to start with the text of the statute.
Subsection 1961(4) defines the term "enterprise" as including
"any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, or any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
corporations could all be RICO defendants and also be considered jointly as constituting an association-in-fact enterprise).
27
28

452 U.S. 576 (1981).
674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982).
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not a legal entity. ' 29 The first obvious-though sometimes apparently
missed-observation about this definition is that association in fact is
juxtaposed with "legal entity," thereby clearly demonstrating that the
term "enterprise" contemplates more than just legitimate, run-of-themill businesses. The second observation from the text is the disjunction between "union" and an association-in-fact group in the second
clause: does this mean to suggest that one's conceptual understanding
of an association-in-fact group should be similar to the concept of a
union (i.e., a loose association of individuals) ,30 or rather does the
disjunction show that these are two distinct kinds of organizations that
give definition to the term "enterprise" along with legal entities? Textual canons of statutory construction suggest the former,3 1 and this
has important implications for how one is to understand associationin-fact enterprises. If a union is the frame of reference for what an
association-in-fact enterprise looks like, then any sort of rigid structural requirement 2 finds little support in the text of the statute.
Third, that no structural limitation inheres in the text is further
strengthened by considering the existence of a "partnership" among
29 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000).
30 Contrary to the views of many commentators, who would compare the association-in-fact concept to a corporation, see, e.g., Michael A. Gardiner, The EnterpriseRequirement: Getting to the Heart of Civil Rico, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 663, 690, the pairing of a
union with the association-in-fact concept in the statute suggests the comparison to a
much more loosely-knit and far less hierarchical group of individuals is more appropriate. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 616-18 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the traditional understanding of a union was not as a separate entity at all,
but just a collection of individuals, because unions generally were not recognized as
litigants at common law).
31 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 826
(3d. ed. 2001) (citing the well-known textual canon of allowing punctuation as an aid
to statutory construction). In this case, the fact that there are two clauses separated by
a comma in the definition of "enterprise" clearly suggests that "union" and "association in fact" are of the same kind. The textual canon noscitur a sociis provides further support for this conclusion. See Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v.
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 372 (2003) ("[U]nder the established
interpretative canon[ ] of noscitur a sociis[,] where general words follow specific
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar to those enumerated by the specific words.").
32 A distinctness requirement, such as the one re-introduced by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 663-64, in a slightly different form than as
first conceived in United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), would especially be suspect if the union is the frame of reference for an association-in-fact enterprise. See David Vitter, Comment, The RICO Enterprise as Distinct from the Pattern of
RacketeeringActivity: Clarifying the Minority View, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1419 (1988) (highlighting the difference between the distinctness requirement in Bledsoe and that of its
predecessor Anderson).

2005]

ASSOCIATION

IN

FACT

33 Corporate law holds
the statute's enumerated forms of enterprises.
that "a partnership is formed if two or more persons go into a coowned business without any thought or planning or understanding of
4
what the relationship is."3 Thus, if a simple association to do business

together without any formal or distinct structure forms a partnership,
so too should a simple association to commit a pattern of racketeering
activity without any formal or distinct structure form a RICO
enterprise.
The examples of the union and the partnership, then, provide a
clear understanding of what the text of RICO means by a group of
individuals "associated in fact though not a legal entity." All that is
required is an association of individuals with the purpose of doing
whatever criminal activities they plan on doing. No hierarchical structure, no decisionmaking unit, no activities distinct from the racketeering acts, and no far reaching plans or purposes are required by the
text.
Finally, one must note the general directive Congress provided in
the text of RICO mandating that RICO "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 35 Courts should not take this instruction lightly in interpreting the association-in-fact provision, and the
inclusion of such a directive in the statute further cements the conclusion that the association-in-fact provision should have a broad
interpretation.
Does the Legislative History Narrow the Statutory Definition of an
"Association-in-FactEnterprise"?

B.

Just as the text of the enterprise definition contemplates an expansive view of what constitutes an association-in-fact enterprise, nothing in the legislative history counsels narrowing the expansiveness of
the textual definition of an association-in-fact enterprise.
To start, in dealing with the legislative history of RICO, the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that only "clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary" of clear statutory language
36
will support the narrowing of RICO's text. In the case of the association-in-fact enterprise, not only is the legislative history unambiguous,
but it also clearly supports broadly interpreting the statutory language.
33
34

18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
ROBERT W.

RATIONS

HAMILTON

& JONATHAN R.

MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-

10 (8th ed. 2003).

35 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
36 Nat'l Org. of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 261 (1994).
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Regarding RICO's legislative history, the House report on the Organized Crime Control Act adds much to strengthen the textual analysis given above: 37 it states that since the definition of "enterprise"
includes "associations in fact ... infiltration of any associativegroup by
any individual or group capable of holding a property interest can be
reached."3 8 This language certainly seems to contemplate a broad understanding of what constitutes an association in fact. Looking at this
language, one would be hard pressed to argue that Congress believed
limitations to the association-in-fact concept existed beyond what inhered in the nature of the word "association."
Nevertheless, there are those who argue that when enacting the
Organized Crime Control Act, "Congress' primary concern was the
infiltration of organized crime into the national economy, and that
prosecutions should not be brought if far afield from congressional
purposes." 39 They claim that "RICO's chief proponents intended to
limit the statute's reach to traditional organized crime" and did not
mean for RICO to be applied against "small-time criminals" or anything outside the traditional organized crime paradigm. 40 To support
their argument, the proponents of the narrow interpretation cite the
37 See supra Part I.A.
38 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4032 (emphasis added). Courts have thus taken this language in the House Report and the
language of the statute itself to find that association-in-fact enterprises can be composed of both legal entities and individuals. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,
625 (5th Cir. 1982):
Use of the verb "includes" in the statutory definition indicates congressional
intent not to limit a RICO enterprise to the specific categories listed; rather,
the language "reveals that Congress opted for a far broader definition of the
word 'enterprise.'" Moreover, the House report accompanying RICO stated
that "enterprise" included "associations in fact, as well as legally recognized
associative entities. Thus infiltration of any associativegroup by any individual
or group capable of holding a property interest can be reached."
Id. (citations omitted).
39 David M. Ludwick, Note, Restricting RICO: Narrowing the Scope of Enterprise, 2
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'v 381, 416 (1993) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATroRNEvs' MANUAL §§ 9-110.000 to -111.700 (1990)).
40 Id. at 385; see also Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 227 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, C.J.):
The prototypical RICO case is one in which a person bent on criminal activity seizes control of a previously legitimate firm and uses the firm's resources, contacts, facilities, and appearance of legitimacy to perpetrate
more, and less easily discovered, criminal acts than he could do in his own
person ....

A step away from the prototypical case is one in which the criminal uses the
acquired enterprise to engage in some criminal activities but for the most

20051

ASSOCIATION

IN

FACT

1967 report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice, 4 1 to which Congress was supposedly reacting when it passed the Organized Crime Control Act and its Title
IX RICO provisions. According to one of the proponents of this narrow interpretation of association-in-fact enterprises:
One of the cornerstones of the Report was sociologist Donald Cressey's analysis of the nature of criminal organizations[, and] Cressey's observation that an "organized criminal" is one who has
committed a crime while occupying an organizational position for
was not
committing that crime bolsters the argument that Congress
42
activities.
criminal
confederated
concerned with loosely
To further bolster this claim, proponents of the narrow interpretation of the association-in-fact enterprise provision cite predecessor
4
bills to RICO proposed in Congress, such as Senate Bill 2187, 3 "which
44
sought to prohibit membership in organized crime generally"; Senate Bill 2048, which sought to outlaw investment of unreported in45
come in establishing or operating a business enterprise; Senate Bill
2049,46 which sought to prohibit those who committed certain crimes
47
from investing their ill-gotten gain in "any business enterprise"; and
Senate Bill 1623,48 which essentially "adopted the key features of the
prior bills." 49 All of these prior bills had as their exclusive domain
organized crime and only organized crime, or so the argument goes.
Congress, however, realized that it could not just prohibit the status of
50
being a member of an organized crime gang. Thus, proponents of a
part is content to allow it to continue to conduct its normal, lawful
business ....

Id.
41

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, TASK FORCE

(1967).
42 Ludwick, supra note 39, at 386.
43 S. 2187, 89th Cong. § 2(a) (1965) (providing that anyone who "becomes or
remains a member of (1) the Mafia, or (2) any other organization having for one of
its purposes" racketeering activity shall be guilty of a felony).
44 Ludwick, supra note 39, at 385.
45 S. 2048, 90th Cong. § 2 (1967).
46 S. 2049, 90th Cong. § 3 (1967).
47 Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E.
Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 774, 777 (1988) (citation omitted); see also Ludwick, supra
REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME

note 39, at 386 (discussing Senate Bill 2049).

48 S. 1623, 91st Cong. § 3 (1969).
49 Ludwick, supra note 39, at 386; see also Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 777,
786-87 (discussing Senate Bill 1623).
50

Ludwick, supra note 39, at 387 ("Congress could not simply outlaw member-

ship in a criminal organization ....");see also Gerald E.Lynch, The Crime of Being a
Criminal (pts. 1 & 2), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661, 706, 932-45 (1987) (arguing against
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narrow interpretation of an association-in-fact enterprise argue that
the reason why RICO's association-in-fact language sounds broad is because Congress-worried about organized crime-had to define organized crime through conduct, namely the pattern of racketeering
activity, and structure, namely the enterprise. 51 However, "[b]ecause
Congress did not tailor this enterprise element narrowly, courts applying RICO have extended it far beyond its intended purposes.."52
This argument from "legislative history" is all very sweet sounding. However, there is somewhat of a flaw to it: the argument has no
support from the actual legislative history. The House Report, cited
above, 5 3 obviously does not support a narrow reading. Certainly, statements from members of Congress do highlight Congress's special intention concerning RICO to target organized crime. For instance,
Senator McClellan, one of the primary sponsors of the Organized
Crime Control Act, stated that RICO "is aimed at removing organized
crime from our legitimate organizations." 54 Similarly, Senator
Hruska, the other primary sponsor, remarked that RICO "is designed
to remove the influence of organized crime from legitimate business
by attacking its property interests and by removing its members from
control of legitimate businesses which have been acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering methods.

'55

Just because Congress had the special intention in mind of attacking organized crime, however, does not mean that Congress designed
RICO and association-in-fact enterprises exclusively for combating organized crime and nothing else. The Supreme Court in H.J.Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. directly rejected this view when the
Court stated that "the argument for reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern concept, whatever the merits and demerits
of such a limitation as an initial legislative matter, finds no support in
the Act's text, and is at odds with the tenor of its legislative history."56
As Justice Brennan convincingly put it later in the opinion:
The occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized
crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime.
statutes that criminalize the mere status of being a gangster as violative of the traditional transaction-based model of crime).
51 See Ludwick, supra note 39, at 387.

52 Id.
53

See supra note 38.

54

116 CONG. REc. 591 (1970).

55

Id. at 602.

56

492 U.S. 229, 244 (1989).
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In Title IX, Congress picked out as key to RICO's application broad
concepts that might fairly indicate an organized crime connection,
but that it fully realized do not either individually or together pro57
vide anything approaching a perfect fit with "organized crime."

Thus, the Supreme Court has resoundingly answered those arguing that RICO should be limited to organized crime and clearly rejected the premise that Congress was only concerned with organized
crime when Congress passed RICO.
Indeed, other statements from the sponsors of the Organized
Crime Control Act amply support the Supreme Court's understanding
of RICO's scope. Responding to the critics of the Organized Crime
Control Act who realized the plain language of the bill went "beyond
organized criminal activity,"58 the sponsors of the bill did not back
down, but rather reaffirmed the breadth of RICO beyond organized
crime. According to Senator McClellan: "The danger posed by organized crime-type offenses to our society has, of course, provided the
occasion for our examination of the working of our system of criminal
justice. But should it follow... that any proposals for action stemming from that examination be limited to organized crime?" 59 Senator McClellan found this logic "seriously defective" in three different
respects. 60 First, "it confuses the occasion for reexamining an aspect
of our system of criminal justice with the proper scope of any new
principle or lesson derived from that reexamination." 61 Just because
Congress was reacting to the problem of organized crime does not
mean that Congress could not use the moment-indeed an infrequent extra-political moment where Congress had enough consensus
and will to act 6 2-to address larger structural weaknesses in the criminal justice system and seek to buttress them. Second, the argument
that Congress meant RICO only to apply against organized crime
"confuses the role of the Congress with the role of a court" because
Congress is not limited to the narrow facts of the problem that
57 Id. at 248.
58 S. REP. No. 91-617, at 215 (1970) (statement of Senators Hart and Kennedy);
see also H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 246-47 (stating that "the legislative history shows that
Congress knew what it was doing when it adopted commodious language capable of
extending beyond organized crime").
59 116 CONG. REC. 18,913 (1970), quoted in H.J.Inc., 492 U.S. at 246.
60 Id., quoted in H.J.Inc., 492 U.S. at 246.
61 Id., quoted in H.J.Inc., 492 U.S. at 246.
62 See, e.g.,
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 31, at 2-23 (describing one of those
moments I have dubbed "extra-political" (even though they remain very much political! I just could not think of a better descriptive term) with the story of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and also describing the many difficulties facing an attempted legislative solution even to such a problem that the whole nation identifies).
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spurred the legislation at issue. 63 According to Senator McClellan:
"Congress has the duty of enacting a principled solution to the entire
problem." 64 Finally, as a practical matter "there are very real limits on
the degree to which such provisions can be strictly confined to organized crime cases,' 65 especially with the clamoring of those who would
find the mere prohibition of the "status" of organized criminal offen66
sive to the Constitution.
The legislative history, then, completely clarifies that Congress
did not intend to limit RICO's association-in-fact enterprise concept
only to organized crime. Conceptually, the House Report provided,
and RICO's drafters along with the Supreme Court understood, that
the association-in-fact enterprise provision allowed for the infiltration
of "any associative group"67 to be punished. This understanding, coupled with the broad language of the statute explored above, should
provide a frame of reference for critiquing the many applications of
RICO by the courts. The following material demonstrates clearly how
and when courts wield RICO's association-in-fact enterprise concept
in a manner consonant with this understanding of its text and legislative history, furthering the Act's objectives. It also demonstrates when
courts do not apply the association-in-fact concept in a manner consistent with RICO's text and legislative history, frustrating the Act's
68
objectives.

63 116 CONG. REc. 18,914 (1970), quoted in H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 246.
64 Id., quoted in H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 247.
65 Id., quoted in H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 247; see also id. at 35,204 (statement of Rep.
Poff) ("[I]t is probably impossible precisely and definitively to define organized
crime. But if it were possible, I ask my friend, would he not be the first to object that
in criminal law we establish procedures which would be applicable only to a certain
type of defendant?").
66 See Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 783 n.72.
67 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
68 See R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985):
The scope of the civil RICO statute is breathtaking. An allegation of fraud in
a contract action can transform an ordinary state law claim into a federal
racketeering charge. It may be unfortunate for federal courts to be burdened by this kind of case, but it is not for this Court to question policies
decided by Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court.
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OLD MYrHS DIE HARD: THE ORIGINS IN LAW OF THE "ORGANIZED
CRIME" RESTRICTIONS ON ASSOCIATION-IN-

FACT ENTERPRISES

69

With law, as in history, everything is about context. To see where
the association-in-fact enterprise concept in RICO is going, we must
first examine where it has been.
A.

The Pre-Turkette Cases: Some Initial Hints at Judicial ReInterpretationof the Association-in-FactEnterprise

For the most part, in the early cases courts did not have any
trouble finding an association-in-fact enterprise despite broad factual
scenarios. 70 An example of this early broad interpretation of association-in-fact enterprise is United States v. Elliott.71 There, various combinations of the defendants engaged in a wide variety of criminal
activity. For instance, two defendants committed arson by burning
down a community convalescent center; 72 three different defendants
stole cars, occasionally selling some of the cars to one of the arsoncommitting defendants; 73 one of the arson-committing defendants
and two other defendants stole a truckload of Hormel meat;7 4 and a
combination of these defendants and thirty-seven others committed
more than eighteen other criminal acts, 7 5 including obstructing justice, 76 truck and construction equipment theft, 7 7 murder, 78 and illegal
drug transactions. 79 The court found that "the government proved
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an enterprise comprised
of at least five defendants," analogizing the enterprise to a "large business conglomerate" with a chairman of the board, executive committees and "many separate branches of the corporation," such as the
69 This Part relies heavily on the previous work of G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P.
Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive,
Accessory, Aiding, Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 Am. CRM. L. REv. 1345
app. G (1996) (tracing the development of the association-in-fact enterprise concept
from RICO's inception to 1996).
70 Id. at 1646.
71 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
72 Id. at 884-85.
73 Id. at 885-86.
74 Id. at 886-87.

75
76

Id. at 884.
Id. at 887 n.5.

77

Id. at 887-88, 889-91.

78
79

Id. at 888-89.
Id. at 892-94.
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and Amphetamine Sales Department."80 The thread

the court found tying everything together was simply "the desire to
make money."8' Finding this loose association of individuals to be an
enterprise under RICO, the Elliott court reasoned:
Similarly, we are persuaded that "enterprise" includes an informal,
de facto association such as that involved in this case. In defining
"enterprise", Congress made clear that the statute extended beyond
conventional business organizations to reach "any... group of individuals" whose association, however loose or informal, furnishes a
vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes. The
statute demands only that there be association "in fact" when it can82
not be implied in law.
This reasoning in Elliott-a criminal case-should have set the
standard in federal courts for the proper application of the association-in-fact enterprise provision. It teaches, consonantly with the text
and purpose of RICO, that from a single associative group working to
commit a pattern of racketeering activity a court should find an association-in-fact enterprise.
In contrast with the broad application of the statute in cases such
as Elliott, a few courts in the early cases were willing to fasten the belt
much more tightly and apply the association-in-fact enterprise more
narrowly.8 3 A case illustrating the early parsimonious approach is
United States v. Anderson.84 In Anderson, the defendants Anderson and
Mooney had served as county judges in Arkansas, and through a middleman Baldwin they received kickbacks of ten percent of the price of
the merchandise they purchased for their counties, defrauding Arkansas citizens to the tune of $12,000.85 The indictment charged an asso-

ciation in fact between each of the defendants and Baldwin "to obtain
80

Id. at 898.

81 Id. Many have criticized the finding of this type of association-in-fact enterprise, claiming that it allows federal prosecutors to bring federal charges out of "nothing more than a series of simple statutory violations." See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley,
Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IoWA L. REv. 837, 879
(1980). Arguments that this application of the statute is not within the ambit of the
language of the statute or was not what Congress had in mind when it passed RICO
fall flat for reasons set out supra in Part I.
82 Elliott, 571 F.2d at 897-98.
83 See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 69, at 1646.
84 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980). The Anderson court was following the lead of
the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), which had
held that separate proof was required for the individual elements of RICO. See Blakey
& Roddy, supra note 69, at 1646.
85 Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1361-62.
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money by means of false and fraudulent pretenses." 86 Though, as argued above,8 7 no language in the association-in-fact provision would
seem to prevent the recognition of the alleged enterprise in Anderson,
the court declined to follow what it termed the "broad construction"
of the "association-in-fact enterprise" and held the term "encompass[es] only an association having an ascertainable structure which
exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an
economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from
the commission of the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity.' "88 Because the government's evidence on the enterprise element consisted solely of "evidence indicating an association
89
to commit the pattern of racketeering activity," the alleged associa-

tion-in-fact enterprise was not distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity and therefore failed to constitute a RICO violation.
The Anderson court was evidently quite worried about the possible
expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction that RICO as written would
certainly entail.90 Due to this concern, the Anderson court interpreted
RICO's association-in-fact enterprise concept in such a way as to constrict the statute's broad reach. Seizing on the "motivating policy of
the Act," namely "free[ing the] nation's economic system from the
tentacles of organized crime," 9 1 the court argued that interpreting the
''enterprise" concept as something substantially different from the
"pattern of racketeering activity" was most in line with RICO's motivating policy. 92 The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it

finds no support from the statutory text or legislative purpose. 9 3 Insofar as the Anderson court interpreted the association-in-fact provision
contrary to the text and legislative purpose in order to infuse the statute with its own policy judgment on the limits of federal jurisdiction,
its interpretation was illegitimate.
86

Id. at 1362.

87

See supra notes 29-65 and accompanying text.

88

Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1372.

Id. at 1369.
90 See id. ("We find nothing in the statutory scheme to suggest that Congress intended to discard the traditional legal precepts applied to concerted criminal activity,
or that Congress intended to expand federal jurisdiction to this extent.").
89

91

Id. at 1372.

92 See id. at 1365, 1371-72. To justify this conclusion from policy, the court made
the textual argument that "association in fact" is limited by the entity words preceding
it in the definition of an enterprise. Id. at 1366. As was shown supra Part IA, this
argument is not very persuasive from the text of the statute.
93

See supra Part I.
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The Sixth Circuit evinced a similar intent in United States v. Sutton,9 4 though it went about its work in a different manner. The Sutton
court distorted the phrase in the legislative history which stated that
one of the purposes of RICO was "the elimination of the infiltration of
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations95 to
mean that association-in-fact enterprises are limited only to those entities that are "organized and acting for some ostensibly lawful purpose." 9 6 The desire to limit the association-in-fact enterprise provision
in Sutton also sprung from the organized crime myth. As explained by
the en banc panel decision reversing Sutton:
The concerns which motivated the majority of the [Sutton]
panel . . .appear to be these. Some of the deepest concerns of
Congress about organized crime came from testimony about major
interlocking interstate criminal conspiracies like the Mafia. Many of
these criminal activities had serious impact on legitimate businesses.
The statute as drafted, however, also strikes at criminal organizations which have much less in the way of financial and manpower
resources than those which drew most Congressional attention.
These might be subject to appropriate control and suppression
through traditional state law enforcement. Therefore, argued the
majority of the [Sutton] panel, the statute should be construed
under the principle that lenity should be required so that the government must allege and prove that the conspiracy involved in the
indictment had an impact on legitimate business, in accordance
with one of Congress' deep concerns. This would be accomplished
by judicially modifying the word "enterprise," as used by Congress,
97
to read "ostensibly legitimate enterprise.'
Judicial legislation was thus the means courts such as those deciding Sutton and Anderson used to re-interpret the association-in-fact enterprise provision to bring it in line with that particular court's
understanding of what Congress should have meant in drafting RICO.
While both the Sutton and Anderson readings of the association-infact enterprise are equally disingenuous in their attempts to read the
courts' own policies into the statute, only the Sutton court's reading
was to receive its direct comeuppance from the Supreme Court-as
we shall see-in United States v. Turkette.98 The Anderson case, meanwhile, though based on an equally invalid premise implicitly discred94
95
96
97
98

605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd en banc, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980).
S.REP. No. 91-617, at 76 (1970) (emphasis added).
Sutton, 605 F.2d at 270.
United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1009 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
452 U.S. 576 (1981).
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ited in Turkette,99 was cited approvingly by the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Bledsoe. 0 0 Anderson thus has had its legacy continued,
preventing both the government from coming down hard on socially
unacceptable conduct' 0 1 and well-meaning plaintiffs from seeking the
remedies that RICO provides.' 0 2 Courts should deal with this discrepancy, therefore, by freeing the association-in-fact enterprise of the artificially constructed bonds first devised by the willfulness of the
Anderson court.
B. Turkette
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Turkette,
found itself in a position to replant at least some of the previous law
on association-in-fact enterprises to the proper ground of the language and legislative history of RICO. In Turkette, the indictment of
the respondent alleged the commission of eight counts of various
criminal acts, ranging from distribution of controlled substances to
several counts of insurance fraud through arson. 10 3 The indictment
also had a ninth count, which alleged that the "common thread to all
counts was respondent's alleged leadership" of a RICO association-infact criminal enterprise. 10 4 Although convicted on all nine counts after a jury trial, the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that because
RICO was only intended to protect legitimate business enterprises
against the infiltration of organized crime, it did not extend to enterprises that were solely devoted to performing5 illegal acts and had not
10
attempted to infiltrate legitimate business.
Faced squarely with the limitation applied by the court in United
States v. Sutton, the Supreme Court reversed. A few points from Justice
White's opinion for the Court are extremely pertinent here. First, Justice White clearly rejected the application of ejusdem generis that
99 See Vitter, supra note 32, at 1431-44.
100 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982).
101 See, e.g., id. at 667 (reversing RICO convictions for various offenses involving
the fraudulent sale of agricultural cooperative securities because, among other things,
the government had not alleged an overarching structure distinct from the separate
instances of racketeering activity).
102 See, e.g., Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing RICO
charges brought by victims of a real estate fraud scheme against the participants in
the scheme on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege a structure distinct from
the pattern of racketeering activity); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus.,
972 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a claim of a fraudulent scheme did not

show an entity separate and apart from the racketeering activity).
103 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 580.
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both the Anderson 0 6 and Sutton courts used to justify their limitation
of the association-in-fact concept. 10 7 In the words of Justice White:
"[T] here is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact."'1 8 Second, Justice White clarified that just because an
enterprise only engages in criminal acts does not mean that the recognition of an association-in-fact enterprise causes the "pattern of racketeering activity" to merge with the "enterprise."'1 9 Both the
"enterprise" and the "pattern of racketeering activity" remain separate
concepts that both must be proved. l1 0 In a few crucial sentences, Justice White further elaborated on the interplay between these two
elements:
The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons
associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course
of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other
hand a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. The former
is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number
of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. While the proof used to establish these separate elements
may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily
establish the other."'
Thus, the Supreme Court reads the statute very broadly, as Congress intended it to be read. Justice White noted that the organization
of the association in fact can be "formal or informal," thus implicitly
invalidating any reading of the association-in-fact provision that might
require a business-like formal structure for the criminal organization.
Justice White's statement that proof of the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise may coalesce also nullifies any reading of the
association-in-fact provision that requires the enterprise to be distinct
from the pattern of racketeering activity." 2 Finally, that the enterprise does not need to exist apart from the pattern of racketeering
106 See supra note 92.
107 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581.
108 Id. at 580.
109

Id. at 583.

110 See id. The Court further hammered this point home by noting that "[t]he
'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity'; it is an entity separate and
apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages." Id.
111 Id.
112 Just because the "enterprise" and the "pattern of racketeering activity" are separate statutory elements does not mean that the plaintiff must show that they have a
distinctness from each other in actual reality.

2005]

ASSOCIATION

IN

FACT

activity also implicitly invalidates any continuity requirement in the
be a function of
enterprise itself, because continuity will necessarily
1 13
element.
the pattern of racketeering activity
This conclusion-that the Supreme Court reads the associationin-fact provision broadly-is further buttressed by the Court's discussion of the legislative history. The Turkette Court noted that the legislative history "indicate[s] that Congress was well aware that it was
entering a new domain of federal involvement" in crime by enacting
RICO. 1 14 Despite the objection that RICO would expand federal jurisdiction in areas of substantive criminal law that were formerly controlled by the police power of the states, "Congress nonetheless
proceeded to enact the measure" without providing any limitations in
are withthe text of the statute. 11 5 Thus, the Court reasoned, "courts
1 16
statute."
the
of
application
the
out authority to restrict
C. Bledsoe: Turkette Ignored and the "New" Restrictions on
Associations in Fact
Turkette, then, counsels against restricting the association-in-fact
enterprise beyond a finding of a loose association of individuals with
the common purpose of committing the racketeering acts. Unfortunately, many federal appellate courts in the association-in-fact enterprise cases that followed Turkette were quick to ignore the clear
reading and import of Turkette and create new restrictions on association-in-fact enterprises.
Probably the most notorious of the new breed of post- Turkette association-in-fact cases and the case that set the standard for the restrictions on association-in-fact enterprises is the Eight Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Bledsoe.1 17 Decided shortly after Turkette, Bledose both
revitalized the "organized crime myth" and first articulated three new
requirements for association-in-fact enterprises that in some circuits
118
In Bledsoe-interestingly, a crimistill cause grief for civil plaintiffs.
nal case-the Government alleged that a group of twenty-two defendants constituted an association-in-fact enterprise designed "to offer
and sell securities of corporations organized as agricultural coopera113 SeeJIMMY GURULE, COMPLEX CRIMINAL LITIGATION § 2-2 [d] [2] (2000) (explaining the continuity prong of the pattern of racketeering element).
114 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586.
115 Id. at 586-87.
116 Id. at 587.
117 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982).
118 But not to the government, as will be shown infra in Part III.A.
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tives in order to obtain money and property by fraudulent means
from residents of the states of Missouri, Oklahoma, and Arkansas." 119
The Bledsoe court first reiterated the common theme in restrictive
applications of association-in-fact enterprises: namely that the main focus of Congress in enacting RICO was "to prevent organized crime
from infiltrating businesses and other legitimate economic entities,"
and that the application of RICO regarding legitimate enterprises is
relatively clear cut since businesses "have a definite structure and clear
boundaries that limit the applicability" of RJCO. 12° In the context of
association-in-fact enterprises, the Bledsoe court desired to import similar limiting boundaries. The court justified its imposition of these requirements by reference to the "danger of guilt by association" and to
its fear that RICO would become "merely a recidivist statute.' 2 1
Finally, the Bledsoe court set out its requirements for an association-in-fact enterprise. First, the enterprise must be an entity with an
"ascertainable structure" that is "separate and apart from
the pattern
of activity in which it engages." 12 2 In establishing this requirement (a
"distinctness" requirement, as this Note will call such requirements
hereafter),123 the court reached back to pre-Turkette cases and cited
Anderson v. United States approvingly, even though-as was shown
above' 24-a close reading of Turkette discredited the reasoning upon
which the Anderson court relied. 125 The thinly veiled intent behind
119
120
121

Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 659.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 664. The Bledsoe court also rationalized its decision to limit the applica-

tion of the association-in-fact enterprise by noting that the enterprise requirement
in

RICO itself "was designed to limit the applicability of the statute and separate individuals engaged in organized crime from ordinary criminals." Id. at 663. While that
much is obvious (as in any statute a material term will limit the application of the
statute), such a bare statement is far from justifying additional limitations to pleading
association-in-fact enterprises.
122 Id. at 663-65.
123 As we will see infra in Part III, there are many spinoffs of the Bledsoe distinctness requirement that all differ in application to some extent. The basic idea of a
"distinctness" requirement, however, was the brainchild of the Anderson and Bledsoe
courts.
124 See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
125 It is important to stress the relationship between this distinctive-structure requirement and a court's understanding of Congress's intention behind the adoption
of RICO. The more a court views RICO as adopted solely to address organized crime,
the more stringently the court will apply this distinct-structure requirement. As one
district court has noted, not applying the distinct-structure requirement would strip
RICO of its focus on organized crime by ignoring "the organizational nexus at the
heart of the RICO scheme." Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 479 (C.D. Cal.
1985).
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this requirement was to restrict association-in-fact enterprises to "true"
cases of organized crime. 126 Second, the Bledsoe court required that
the government show a "'common purpose' animating [the associa127
This "requirement" was nothtion-in-fact enterprise's] associates."
purpose, and the Supreme
its
statute,
ing new: the language of the
Court in Turkette all appeared to embrace such a requirement-at
least as far as requiring a common purpose to associate together in
128
order to commit the predicate acts.

However, if a court were to

require a common goal animating all members of the enterprise in

Courts have to be careful when applying this judicially-created restriction, however. As one court noted: "Criminal enterprises have less structure than legal
It would be ironic if the RICO statute, aimed primarily at criminal enterones ....
prises such as the Mafia and its many petty imitators, was more effective against legal
enterprises because the latter have a more perspicuous, articulated structure." United
States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991). Consequently, since some
courts did not understand the real pedigree of this requirement-namely to restrict
association-in-fact enterprises to "organized crime" only-these courts have gotten
confused and found that the existence of a legal corporation in the association-in-fact
enterprise is enough to satisfy the distinctness requirement. See, e.g., United States v.
Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 660 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Kirk, 844 F.2d 660, 664
(9th Cir. 1988).
126

See supra note 125.

127 Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 664 (quoting United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 1000
(4th Cir. 1981)).
128 This is all the language of Turkette requires. The Supreme Court stated that an
association-in-fact enterprise is "a group of persons associated together for a common
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583

(1981) (emphasis added). This only makes sense, of course, because RICO was
meant to
relieve some of the deficiencies of the traditional conspiracy prosecution as a
means for coping with contemporary organized crime[, since t]he increasing complexity of 'organized' criminal activity had made it difficult to show
the agreement or common objective essential to proof of conspiracy on the
basis of evidence of the commission of highly diverse crimes by apparently
While within the resulting statutory scheme conunrelated individuals ....
and an associated-in-fact enterprise is plainly inconspiracy
remains
spiracy
tended to be something different and less difficult of proof, they
nevertheless share the basic characteristic that each proscribes purposeful
associations of individuals.
United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1981). If the common purpose of the criminal activity could not be inferred from the racketeering acts and
each racketeer's participation in them, then the association-in-fact enterprise suffers
from the same defect that it was meant to remedy in conspiracy law. See id. at
[
1000-01. As another court put it, " t]he 'enterprise conspiracy' is a broader concept
than that of an ordinary conspiracy." United States v. Russo, 796 F.2d 1443, 1462
(11th Cir. 1986).
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the same manner-as some courts have done in civil RICO cases 12 9then the quintessential case of a mafia family having internal power
struggles would be ruled out as an association-in-fact enterprise. 130
Lastly, the Bledsoe court found the requirement that the enterprise
"function as a continuing unit" with "some continuity of both structure and personality" is "fundamental" to the meaning of an association-in-fact enterprise. 13 1 The Bledsoe court misplaced this so-called
"continuity" requirement, however, as it more properly
belonged with
the "pattern of racketeering" element rather than the "enterprise"
element.132
While Bledsoe was a criminal case, these requirements devised by
the Eighth Circuit certainly shared a common aim: to limit RICO association-in-fact enterprises to what the court considered "organized
crime.' 3 3 Indeed, the Bledsoe requirements grew from their origins in
a criminal RICO case and today find themselves most at home in civil
RICO actions. 134 As we shall see, courts have tailored Bledsoe's re129 See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
130 See United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 710-11 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
the existence of an internal war in the Columbo crime family, the alleged enterprise,
did not negate a finding of a "common purpose").
131 Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 665.
132 According to the Second Circuit:
Neither the statutory definition of enterprise nor the legislative history suggests that those concepts[-relatedness and continuity-]pertain to the notion of enterprise. Rather, the language and the history suggest that
Congress sought to define that term [enterprise] as broadly as possible, "includ[ing]" within it every kind of legal entity and any "group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity."
United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1382 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (1988)).
133 The Eighth Circuit has been quite clear about the fact that its restrictions are
designed to limit association-in-fact enterprises to organized crime. "[T]he Eighth
Circuit has recognized, [for instance, that] 'the command system of a Mafia family is
an example of th [e] type of structure' that is distinct from the pattern of racketeering
activity." United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 425 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 665).
134 Indeed, in this author's survey of fifty criminal and thirty civil post- Turkette federal appellate cases where an issue as to the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise existed, only two criminal cases failed to find an enterprise. Of the two
exceptions, one of the cases failed to find an enterprise because all of the alleged
enterprise's members were either dead or in jail, see United States v. Morales, 185 F.3d
74, 81 (2d Cir. 1999), while the other was Bledsoe itself. In twenty-four out of the thirty
civil cases, however, courts failed to find an enterprise. While certainly some of these
results are due to poor plaintiffs' lawyering, as for the rest, it is hard to believe the
federal government's criminal attorneys are just that much smarter than the attorneys
of the private plaintiffs. One cannot blame this phenomenon on the standard of
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quirement of structure distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity so as to apply neatly to almost every criminal gang, no matter how
loose the association, while having a clumsy and narrow application in
the civil context.1 35 Courts also require a loose common purpose in
criminal cases,' 3 6 but they demand a much more restrictive common
purpose in civil cases.13 7 Furthermore, finding continuity of structure
13 8 so long
and personnel does not bother courts long in criminal cases
1 9
as the courts can find a "leader,"' while in the civil context courts
(especially the Fifth Circuit) have invented restrictive "continuity"
140 Lastly, we shall see the creatests for association-in-fact enterprises.
review, either. While it is true that criminal convictions, especiallyjury verdicts, enjoy
a deferential standard of review, most of the civil cases are decided on summary judgall the
ment or judgment as a matter of law, where the reviewing court not only views
will
also
but
motion,"
the
opposed
that
party
the
to
favorable
most
a
light
evidence "in
find summary judgment appropriate only where "the facts and inferences point so
strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that reasonable persons could not
arrive at a contrary verdict." See, e.g., Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808
F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1987) (giving the Fifth Circuit's formulation of the standards
for summary judgment and JNOV in a RICO case).
135 As one exasperated criminal defendant noted concerning the traits that courts
most often find as demonstrative of distinct structure, "every [criminal] group has a
leader .... every group tries to cover its tracks, and... every group tries to thwart law
enforcement!" United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 60, 71 (D.D.C. 2000).
136 See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 122 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding a
common purpose of "reap[ing] the economic rewards flowing from the crimes").
Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding divergent
137 See, e.g.,
purposes in an enterprise consisting of a corporation that hires illegal aliens and immigrant welfare organizations that find the illegal aliens for the corporation to hire
because the corporation "wants to pay lower wages" while the "recruiters want to be
paid more for services rendered").
138 This is true except in the ridiculously extreme case, like United States v. Morales,
where all the members of the gang were either dead or in jail during the time frame
in which the enterprise was alleged to exist. Morales, 185 F.3d at 81.
139 See, for example, United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337-38 (7th Cir. 1996),
where the only "continuing structure" in the alleged drug dealing enterprise seemed
to be the fact that the defendant King was in charge of all the racketeering activity.
140 See Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1987),
which held that the alleged association was not an association-in-fact enterprise because it lacked continuity. Continuity, according to the Montesano court, could only
be shown by alleging facts tending to prove that the "enterprise ha[d] an existence
It is
that c[ould] be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts." Id.
association-in-fact
ironic that the Fifth Circuit, which correctly interpreted RICO's
provision in Elliott, could turn around ten years later and begin to apply the same
arbitrary restriction that its excellent statutory interpretation in Elliott categorically
ruled out, see United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Congress
made clear that the statute extended beyond conventional business organizations to
reach 'any . . .group of individuals' whose association, however loose or informal,
furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes."), and which
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tive requirements other federal courts of appeals have fabricated, following the lead of the Eighth Circuit in Bledsoe, in order to restrict
association-in-fact enterprises to criminal gangs.' 4' The next Part of
this Note, therefore, briefly outlines the origins of the growing disparity the federal courts of appeals have created between the requirements for criminal association-in-fact enterprises and their civil
counterparts.
III.

Uai

VENIsTI,

ASSOCIATION IN FACT? THE POST-BLEDSOE

DEVELOPMENT AND REFINEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON
ASSOCIATION-IN-FACT ENTERPRISES

The only way to understand how federal appellate courts have
currently hamstrung civil association-in-fact enterprises with demanding and confusing requirements is to first understand how association-

in-fact law developed in the criminal cases which followed Bledsoe. Indeed, the proverbial ink had not yet dried on the Bledsoe decision
when federal appellate courts began either parroting the Bledsoe restrictions-though sometimes with widely divergent interpretations of

those restrictions-or creating new restrictions on association-in-fact
enterprises based on their own "interpretation" of Turkette, almost always with an eye towards restricting RICO association-in-fact enterprises to the "organized crime" ideal. From these early criminal
cases-which never failed to find the existence of an association-infact enterprise-federal courts laid the groundwork to restrict civil
RICO association-in-fact enterprises.
A.

Post-Bledsoe CriminalRICO Association-in-FactEnterprises:
Restrictions Developed but Not Applied

The Eighth Circuit was able to hone the meaning of its Bledsoe
requirements in United States v. Lemm, 14 2 a white collar arson and insurance fraud case. There, one member of the group, a public insurance adjuster, would give another person instructions on committing
arson, and after the arson would act both as the insurance adjuster
and as the private contractor repairing the damage caused by the
the Fifth Circuit only five months earlierhad rejected as a necessary jury instruction in a
criminal case, see United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1093-94 (5th Cir. 1987).
141 Interestingly enough, courts apply most of these limitations at the pleadings
stage despite the requirement of only notice pleading. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,
534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002) (reiterating the simplified notice pleading standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) in civil actions).
142 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982).
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fire. 14 3 In order to accommodate what the court thought to be organized crime 1 4 4 while proceeding carefully so as not to undo its handiwork in Bledsoe, the court reinterpreted what it meant by the three
Bledsoe requirements. The court found the generic common purpose
of "setting arson fires so as to defraud one or more insurance companies"14 5-a purpose with more generality than Bledsoe seemingly allowed. 1 4 6 The Lemm court also suggested that continuity as to the
leader and pattern of roles, not necessarily of personnel, satisfied Bled1 47
soe's requirement of "some continuity of structure and personality."
Regarding the requirement of an ascertainable structure distinct from
the pattern of racketeering activity, the Lemm court suggested this requirement could be satisfied by having diversified criminal activity separate from the criminal activity that made up the pattern-in Lemm,
148
the arson ring was separate from the predicate acts of mail fraud.
This appeared to be different from what the Bledsoe court meant by
"ascertainable structure distinct from the pattern of racketeering activcontrol over the
ity," namely some larger structure that is able to exert
149
activity.
racketeering
individuals involved in the
Three other circuits-the Second, the Eleventh, and the Sixthdid not even make any pretense of restricting association-in-fact enterprises, and in criminal cases all three circuits adopted the Elliott inter15°
a case
pretation of an association in fact. In United States v. Mazzei,
involving a group of individuals associated together to fix Boston College basketball games by point shaving and profit on them by wagering, the Second Circuit found no need for proof that the enterprise
existed "distinct and independent" from the pattern of racketeering
activity, so long as the Government proved that a "'group of individuals associated in fact' with evidence establishing a common or shared
purpose among the individuals and evidence that they functioned as a
143

Id. at 1197.

144 Id. at 1201 ("RICO was appropriately utilized here as a weapon against organized criminal activity.").
145 Id. at 1199.
146 The Government in Bledsoe, you may recall, alleged that the defendants had a
common purpose of obtaining money and property by fraudulent means from residents of the states of Missouri, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
147 Lemm, 680 F.2d at 1199-200; see also supra note 131 and accompanying text
(discussing Bledsoe's requirement).
148 Lemm, 680 F.2d at 1201.
149 See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 667 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Although
many of the defendants played various roles in UFA-Mo., PFA, UFA-Ok., and CFA,
these roles cannot be seen as constituent elements of a larger structure.").
150 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983).
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continuing unit."151 Because the point-shaving conspirators shared

the common purpose of illegally shaving points on the basketball
games to maximize their betting chances and functioned continuously
through the 1978-1979 Boston College basketball season, they properly constituted an association-in-fact enterprise. 52 Similarly, the
Eleventh Circuit, when evaluating an alleged enterprise of various individuals who engaged in a variety of racketeering acts, from murder
to extortion to truck hijacking to narcotics, rejected the requirement
that the enterprise must have an "ascertainable structure" distinct
from the pattern of racketeering.15 3 The Eleventh Circuit found that
this six year long informal association-defined around the predicate
acts of racketeering and with the common purpose of making money
from repeated criminal activity-constituted an association-in-fact enterprise. Joining the Second and Eleventh Circuits was the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Qaoud.a5 4 There, the Government had alleged
in the indictment an association-in-fact enterprise consisting of the individuals who made use of the defendant's office of District Judge of
the Eighteenth District Court in Michigan to conduct a pattern of
bribery. 1 5 5 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
RICO enterprise had to be distinct from the pattern of racketeering
activity, holding that the enterprise and pattern of racketeering may
be proved by the same evidence and that the Government in this case
had properly alleged an association-in-fact enterprise. 156 With these
holdings, the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits not only correctly
followed the statutory definition of RICO, but also were honest about
151 Id. at 89 ("There is nothing in the language or legislative history of the Act to
support the... 'distinctness' requirement in RICO cases."). The Mazzei court seemed
most concerned about the Lemm interpretation of distinctness, as it thought that such
an interpretation would require the government to prove that the enterprise engaged
in more than one different kind of racketeering activity. See id. (giving an example of
a large scale heroin enterprise engaging solely in heroin trafficking and expressing
the concern that under the "distinctness" requirement the heroin enterprise would
not be subject to the prohibitions of RICO).
152 Id. at 89-90 ("Crime is no less organized where its purposes are singular.").
153 United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 920-22 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Turkette did
not suggest that the enterprise must have a distinct, formalized structure. Instead, the
Supreme Court noted that the organization may be formal or informal."). In United
States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1984), moreover, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated its rejection of the "distinctness" requirement, holding that an even more loosely
knit association of fraudulent "bustout" corporations-corporations that referenced
each other in order to establish credit, buy on that credit, and then go bust-constituted a RICO association-in-fact enterprise. Id. at 1311-12.
154 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985).
155 Id.at 1116.
156 Id.at 1115.
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the fact that they were not going to limit criminal RICO association-infact enterprises.
The Ninth Circuit, meanwhile, while not directly answering
whether the Government had to prove that the association-in-fact enterprise existed apart from the commission of the pattern of racketeering activity, had no trouble finding that an association-in-fact
enterprise did exist in criminal cases. In a pre-Bledsoe criminal case,
the Ninth Circuit had seemingly endorsed the Elliott interpretation of
association-in-fact enterprises,1 57 but later backed away from that position. In United States v. DeRosa, the Government had alleged that the
defendants engaged in an ongoing enterprise for the selling and distribution of narcotics. 158 The court found the evidence that the defendants had a lengthy association probative of whether the enterprise
was "ongoing."'

59

The Ninth Circuit then examined whether the en-

terprise existed separate from the predicate acts of narcotics distribution, giving a new twist to Bledsoe's requirement that there be an
ascertainable structure to the enterprise distinct from the predicate
acts forming the pattern of racketeering. The DeRosa court found attempts by the defendants to "franchise" out their drug distribution
business to other criminals sufficient evidence of an160enterprise standing apart from the pattern of racketeering activity.
157 See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 1981). In noting
that "the government is not precluded from using the same evidence to establish both
the element of an enterprise and the element of a pattern of racketeering," the
Bagnariol court implicitly ruled out the requirement that the Government show the
enterprise existed separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity. Id. In
fact, the Qaoud court listed Bagnariolas a case that had rejected that there must be
proof of the enterprise that is distinct from the proof of a pattern of racketeering. See
Qaoud, 777 F.2d at 1115-16.
158 670 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1982).
159 Id. at 896.
160 Id. The First Circuit seemed to take a similar tack as the Ninth Circuit. While
it did not specifically endorse the Bledsoe restrictions, the First Circuit nevertheless
applied them in criminal RICO cases. The First Circuit never failed, though, to find
an enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1244 (1st Cir. 1995)
(finding an enterprise consisting of a check cashing business and a bar that furthered
an illegal bookmaking operation, where the common purpose was the defendant's
economic gain, the "continuity" or "functioning as a continuing unit" was met by the
businesses' close location and operation by the same individual (the defendant), and
the "distinctness" of the enterprise from the pattern of racketeering activity consisted
of the services that the bar and the check cashing businesses provided to their legitimate customers); United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 68 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding an
enterprise consisting of individuals in a police department who stole exams from the
department and sold them to those studying for a promotion where there were more
than ten instances of the defendants stealing exams over a period of several years and
the same defendants participated in the stealing of the exams).
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While remaining noncommittal as to whether the three-prong
analysis in DeRosa was actually required, in two later criminal cases,
United States v. Feldman1 6' and United States v. Blinder,1 62 the Ninth Circuit's case law on the association-in-fact enterprise analysis greatly developed, though not at the price of letting criminal enterprises off the
hook. Feldman involved a defendant who kept his creditors at bay by
defrauding insurance companies with repeated acts of arson committed on businesses which the defendant owned. 163 The Ninth Circuit
applied the three Bledsoe requirements to the alleged criminal enterprise and found that they were met in this case. 16 4 Importantly, when
reviewing the "common purpose" requirement, the Ninth Circuit
stated that RICO did "not require intentional or 'purposeful' behavior
by corporations charged as members of an association-in-fact," 165 but
only a showing of common purpose through proof "'of an ongoing
organization, formal or informal, and evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.' "166 While this is undoubtedly the
correct interpretation of what the Supreme Court meant in Turkette by
a "common purpose," this is often ignored by courts in the civil context when the courts use the common-purpose requirement to thwart
the finding of an association-in-fact enterprise. 6 7 The Feldman court
also found the requisite continuity of structure and personnel in the
fact that the defendant and his brother managed each of the businesses in the enterprise.1 68 In a strange twist on the requirement that
161

853 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1988).

162

10 F.3d 1468 (9th Cir. 1993).

163 Feldman, 853 F.2d at 651-52. The indictment listed the association-in-fact enterprise as the defendant and his businesses, and gave the common purpose of "defrauding insurance companies and others through repeated acts of arson." Id. at 655.
164 Id. at 660.
165 Id. at 657.
166 Id. (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
167 See, e.g., Baker v.IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2004); see also infta notes
247-50 and accompanying text (discussing the actions of courts in the civil context).
Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit in Feldman cited United States v. Ambrose-a
Seventh Circuit criminal case-for this proposition! See United States v. Ambrose, 740
F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit in Ambrose held, in essence, that the
defendant, a member of the Chicago Police Department, could "conduct a pattern of
racketeering activity" through an enterprise-namely the Chicago Police Department-that was legitimate and did not share the defendant's illegitimate goals. Id. at
512. It is not too far down the chain of logic from this holding in Ambrose to the
conclusion that members of an enterprise can have different "goals" in the sense that
one has a lawful goal while another has an illegal goal, while all the while being "associated together for a common purpose." See id. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit in
Baker chose to ignore what was clearly implied in its holding in Ambrose.
168 Feldman, 853 F.2d at 658-59.
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the enterprise have an ascertainable structure separate and distinct
from the pattern of racketeering activity, however, the court found
that "the very existence of a corporation me [t] the requirement for a
separate structure" from the pattern of racketeering activity, and also
noted the presence of a legitimate money making goal for the association of corporations, which the court labeled the defendant's "business interests."1 69 This dicta in Feldman concerning the "distinctness"
requirement was further clarified in United States v. Blinder, a case involving an association-in-fact enterprise consisting of the defendant,
his compatriot, the defendant's securities brokerage firm, another
brokerage firm, and two "blind pool" corporations.1 70 There, the
court rejected the argument that all the members who compose the
enterprise, taken together as a unit, must have a separate economic
goal from the pattern of racketeering activity in order to fulfill the
distinctness requirement, as opposed to just corporate members of
the association-in-fact enterprise having separate goals from the pattern of racketeering activity. 171 Because the two brokerage firms engaged in normal securities brokerage operations besides the alleged
activities with the "blind pool" corporations, the court found the "separate-existence" test to be met. 172 The progression of cases from DeRosa to Feldman to Blinder, then, shows that the Ninth Circuit, while not
formally adopting any of the Bledsoe restrictions, developed its case law
with an eye to applying those restrictions-though not in the criminal
context. Particularly, the Ninth Circuit adopted an interpretation of
the "distinctness" requirement that the government seemingly could
easily satisfy through allegations that any one corporate member of
the association-in-fact enterprise participated in activities outside of
the racketeering acts, or allegations that the individual members of
the association-in-fact enterprise associated together to participate in
activities outside of the alleged racketeering acts.
169 Id. at 660.
170 10 F.3d 1468, 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1993). A "blind pool" corporation is a corporation "with no actual or anticipated business operations." United States v. Haddy,
134 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 1998).
171 Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1475. The court nonetheless speculated that the enterprise
alleged in Blinder would meet this test, because the defendant set up "blind pool"
companies other than those alleged as the basis for the predicate acts of racketeering,
and all the members of the enterprise did "'maintain operations toward[ ] an economic goal separate from the commission of the alleged predicate acts' ... that is, the
bringing public of the blind pool companies that were not the subject of the predicate offenses." Id. (quoting United States v. McClendon, 712 F. Supp. 723, 727 (E.D.
Ark. 1988)).
172 Id. at 1474.
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Three other circuits-the Fourth, the Third, and the Tenthwhile accepting restrictions on association-in-fact enterprises, did not
have trouble finding that the criminal gangs they confronted met the
Bledsoe restrictions. In United States v. Riccobene,173 a case involving an
organized crime family engaged in numerous different criminal activities, the Third Circuit applied three restrictions. First, the association
had to have structure in that it had some way of controlled decisionmaking. 174 The court found this element satisfied by the fact that the
criminal gang was "organized" in the typical manner, with a boss and
underlings.' 75 Second, the association had to function as a "continuing unit," with each member having a role within the structure. Here,
this requirement was easily satisfied by pointing to the structure of the
family and the defendants' roles within it.176 Third, the enterprise
had to have an existence beyond what was necessary to commit the
pattern of racketeering activity. This was satisfied by showing the
"overseeing and coordinating [of] the commission of several different
predicate offenses and other activities on an on-going basis"l 77-an
interpretation similar to Lemm. a78 The Tenth Circuit applied essentially the same restrictions in a case involving a heroin distribution
ring, United States v. Sanders.179 As far as ongoing organization and
decisionmaking, the Sanders court found those requirements satisfied
by evidence that one member was in charge of selling the heroin and
that the defendant was in charge of maintaining supply, with various
173
174

709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 222.

175 Id. at 222-23. Indeed, Riccobene involved the activities of a Philadephia "crime
family," id. at 216, the model for those who believe the "organized crime myth." See,
e.g., Gardiner, supra note 30, at 698 ("[I]t is the enterprise requirement that separates
the organized wheat from the loosely-associated chaff."). In another case involving an
insurance fraud scam conducted through inflated medical bills, the Third Circuit
found this requirement satisfied by the combined supervision of the complicit doctor
and accomplice law firm managing partner over the whole scheme. United States v.
Console, 13 F.3d 641, 651 (3d Cir. 1993).
176 Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 223. In Console, the alleged enterprise satisfied this requirement because each member of the enterprise had a defined role in the fraud,
with the doctor and the managing partner of the law firm supervising and various
employees of the firm referring clients to the doctor, coaching them to make false
statements about their medical treatment, and actually falsifying the records. Console,
13 F.3d at 651.
177 Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 223-24. Similarly, in the later Third Circuit Console case,
the alleged enterprise satisfied this requirement through the showing that they committed multiple predicate offenses and did legitimate business besides the racketeering activity. Console, 13 F.3d at 652.
178 United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1201 (8th Cir. 1982).
179 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991).
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underlings overseeing the distribution of the heroin on the street. 180
Since the defendant was in prison and still controlling the supply of
heroin, the court had no trouble finding continuity. 18' The Sanders
court, however, did face a problem regarding the distinctness requirement, as the criminal gang here was only involved in heroin distribution and no other legitimate or illegitimate activities. The court
extricated itself from this dilemma by finding that the "group continued to exist and thrive on the proceeds of heroin sales without any
particular contribution of individuals,"1 82 thus further diluting the distinctness requirement in criminal cases.
The Fourth Circuit worded its requirements somewhat differently
18 3
but essentially reached the same result in United States v. Tillett,
which addressed a five year, sporadic marijuana smuggling venture in
which the defendants were the smuggling boat owners and operators.
The Fourth Circuit required an enterprise to have a common purpose, to be an ongoing organization with continuity of personnel and
structure, and to exist separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity. 184 Making money in illegal trafficking of marijuana
proved to be enough of a common purpose, 185 while a change in financial backers for the smuggling did not defeat continuity of structure or continuity of personnel. 18 6 Even though the operation in
Tillett was solely centered around the smuggling of marijuana and
therefore did not seem to pass the Lemm test, 18 7 the court found the
fact that the organization existed in between the actual acts of smuggling 188 demonstrated the existence of the enterprise (literally) "beyond" the predicate acts forming the pattern of racketeering activity.
In an even further variation from Bledsoe, the D.C. Circuit in
United States v. Perholtz required continuity, organization, and common purpose among the defendants in order to find an association-infact enterprise.18 9 These requirements, however, just like the requirements of the other circuits, did not get in the way of finding an association-in-fact enterprise in a criminal case. In Perholtz, where a group
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Id. at 943-44.
Id. at 944.
Id.
763 F.2d 628, 630 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 631.
Id.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.

188 This was evidenced by the establishment of a seafood restaurant to act as a
business front and the purchasing of equipment such as trucks and the actual smuggling boat. Tillett, 763 F.2d at 632.
189 842 F.2d 343, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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of individuals worked together on several occasions to fraudulently
get software development contracts, 190 the common interest of "obtaining the proceeds of government contracts... through the perversion of the bidding process," the defendant's leadership role, and the
existence of a "continuing core of personnel" despite some changes in
accomplices were sufficient to meet the requirements for an association-in-fact enterprise. 1 9 '
Finally, the Seventh Circuit, while willing to apply the Eighth Circuit's "distinctness" requirement to try to limit association-in-fact enterprises to examples of true "organized crime,"'192 did not hesitate to
mold that requirement in criminal cases to fit the description of the
criminal enterprise presented. In United States v. Masters, for instance,
the Seventh Circuit faced an alleged criminal association-in-fact enterprise consisting of the defendant-an attorney-and a police lieutenant, a police chief, two police departments, and the defendant's law
firm. 19 3 While the alleged enterprise certainly engaged in a large
amount of racketeering activity, ranging from police bribery and public corruption to the murder of the defendant's wife, 1 94 the enterprise
did not seem to exhibit the "traits" other courts had found indicative
of distinct structure, such as a centralized decisionmaking structure
and distinct roles, or engaging in other activity besides the racketeering activity. Realizing that despite the lack of the foregoing traits the
enterprise in Masters should be a prototypical RICO enterprise (especially given the corruption of the police departments), the Seventh
Circuit nevertheless found distinct structure evidenced in how quickly
the defendant was able to get his associates to discreetly murder his
19 5
wife.
Thus, as became apparent from cases like Tillett, Lemm, Bledsoe,
and Riccobene, federal appellate courts, despite fashioning new and (in
many ways) artificial parameters to association-in-fact enterprises, certainly were not going to allow criminal gangs to benefit from these
190
191
192
193

Id. at 346-50.
Id. at 354-55.
United States v. Korando, 29 F.3d 1114, 1118 (7th Cir. 1994).
924 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (7th Cir. 1991).

194

Id.

195

See id. at 1367.
The strongest evidence is the handling of the problem of dealing with Dianne Masters. When that problem arose, a loose-knit but effective criminal
organization was in place ready to respond effectively by planning and carrying out a detection-proof crime that would have been beyond the capacities
of the individual defendants acting either singly or without the aid of their
organizations.
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developments. Civil defendants, on the other hand, got different
treatment. As we shall see in the next section, federal appellate courts
took the same restrictions that they had previously applied so loosely
in criminal RICO cases, gave them new meaning, and applied them
with a vengeance against civil RICO plaintiffs in cases involving association-in-fact enterprises.
B.

Civil RICO Association-in-FactEnterprises: Application of the
Restrictions Developed but Not Applied in the Earlier
Criminal Cases

Whether it was from a dearth of civil association-in-fact cases or
slowness on the part of judges to recognize the powerful tools at their
disposal post-Bledsoe, courts were not quick to apply the restrictions
developed in the early criminal association-in-fact cases to civil RICO
associations in fact. By the end of the 1980s, however, federal appellate courts began to realize the potent weapons they possessed to remove more civil RICO cases from federal courtrooms.
The Fifth Circuit started the trend of tightening the belt on civil
association-in-fact enterprises. In a series of cases, starting with Shaffer
v. Williams,196 the Fifth Circuit began to apply the requirements of
common purpose, identifiable structure, and especially continuity (or
ongoing organization) to kick RICO plaintiffs out of federal court.
The Fifth Circuit's application of these strict, Bledsoe-esque requirements was especially ironic given its excellent analysis of the scope of
the enterprise provision in Elliott.197 The plaintiff in Shaffer allegedadmittedly in cryptic fashion198-that the defendant and thirty corporations associated in fact together to make misrepresentations to secure lower insurance premiums and to defraud investors who invested
in the defendants' oil and gas interests. 199 While the plaintiffs allegations certainly left something to be desired in the way of clarity, the
court was still more than eager to hold that the plaintiffs supplemental affidavit lacked allegations of "ongoing organization" (i.e., that a
decisionmaking structure existed for the enterprise), common purpose, identifiable structure, and continuity.20 0 Similarly, in Atkinson v.
Andarko Bank and Trust Co.,20 1 where the plaintiffs had alleged that a
bank, its holding company, and three employees had associated in
196
197
198
199
200
201

794 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1986).
See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
See Shaffer, 794 F.2d at 1032.
See id. at 1031-32.
Id. at 1033.
808 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1987).
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fact to defraud the plaintiffs through mail fraud and charge a higher
rate of interest, the court failed to find evidence that the enterprise
operated separate from the activities of the bank or evidence "that the
five associates functioned as a continuing unit or formed an ongoing
20 2
association."
The Fifth Circuit then seized upon the language of Atkinson and
Shaffer, concerning the need for an "ongoing association" in an association-in-fact enterprise, and combined it with Bledsoe to develop a
unique requirement of "continuity." Under this conception of continuity, even if the defendants met all of the typical Bledsoe requirements-such as a common purpose, hierarchical decisionmaking, and
distinct structure-the Fifth Circuit would still fail to find an association-in-fact enterprise, stating that the enterprise "briefly flourishe[d]
and fade[d]" 203 or that the enterprise only had a "short-term goal." 20 4
Such a restriction, however, is nonsense. Though perhaps such a requirement might find some place in the understanding of the "pattern of racketeering activity" element of RICO, 20 5 it has no business
defining the "enterprise." 20 6 No judge in the criminal RICO context
would dream of dismissing a charge against a group of bank robbers
who had banded together for, say, the "short-term" goal of robbing a
few banks. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has employed this requirement in many cases to rid its docket of civil RICO cases where the
plaintiff had alleged an association-in-fact enterprise. 20 7
In Manax v. McNamara,for instance, the plaintiff had alleged that
the defendant-a lawyer-coordinated a campaign of "malicious and
false public statements" with several defendant newspapers concerning the plaintiffs medical abilities with the purpose of destroying the
plaintiff's medical practice.2 0 8 The Fifth Circuit quickly concluded
that no enterprise existed. Because the association's goal was "shortterm," the association would "presumably" disperse "upon the attainment of that goal." 20 9 Unfortunately, this kind of reasoning abandons
202 Id. at 441.
203 Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v.J.I. Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1988).
204 Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808, 811 (5th Cir. 1988).
205 See GURULt, supra note 113, § 2-2[d] [2] (describing the concept of continuity
as embodied in the pattern-of-racketeering element of RICO).
206 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
207 See Whelan v. Winchester Prod. Co., 319 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2003); Landry
v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 901 F.2d 404, 433-44 (5th Cir. 1990); Delta Truck, 855 F.2d at
243-44; Manax, 842 F.2d at 811; Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126,
129-30 (5th Cir. 1988); Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423,
426-27 (5th Cir. 1987).
208 Manax, 842 F.2d at 811.
209 Id.
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to
RICO's original meaning, as it essentially says that forming a 2group
1
commit crimes for a purpose is not enough to violate RICO.

1

Simi-

larly, in Delta Truck and Tractor Co. v. JI. Case Co., the Fifth Circuit
found the lack of a "continuous threat" fatal to the plaintiffs enterprise allegation that the three corporate defendants associated in fact
together to consolidate their agricultural equipment franchise dealer2 11 The Delta
ships through numerous acts of wire and mail fraud.
court believed it saw a lack of a "continuous threat" because the plaintiff franchisee "attempted to state a RICO claim by alleging multiple
acts of fraud that were part and parcel of a single, discrete and otherwise lawful commercial transaction." 2 12 The Delta court did not, however, consider whether its "continuous-threat" requirement had any
basis in the statute or whether it ever would have applied such a requirement in the criminal context.
With this "continuous-threat" requirement, the Fifth Circuit essentially tells RICO defendants, "look, we know you associated together and committed a number of predicate acts; but because you
have accomplishedyour objective, we are going to let you off the RICO
hook just so long as you don't do it again!"2 13 This certainly cannot
be what Congress wanted to tell RICO defendants when it passed the
law, and certainly is not what courts had been telling criminal RICO
21 4
defendants.
210 One must remember that the original House Report talked of "any associative
group," and any attempts to limit this reach of the RICO association-in-fact provision
during the legislative process were rejected. See supra note 38 and accompanying text;
supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
211 Delta Truck, 855 F.2d at 244.
212 Id.
213 CompareCrowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding the fact that
the two defendants had been committing the same kind of fraud together for five
years dispositive of the issue of continuity and therefore concluding that the plaintiffs
had properly alleged an association-in-fact enterprise), and Ocean Energy II, Inc. v.
Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 749 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding sufficient
evidence of continuity in pleadings that suggested that the defendants had engaged
in the same pattern of racketeering activity on at least one other occasion), with Whelan v. Winchester Prod. Co., 319 F.3d. 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
continuity requirement was not satisfied where the plaintiffs only demonstrated a "few
transactions" in which the alleged enterprise attempted to defraud the plaintiff royalty owners), and Calcasieu Marine Nat'l Bank v. Grant, 943 F.2d 1453, 1462-63 (5th
Cir. 1991) (stating that the accomplishment of a short-term goal is not enough to
satisfy the continuity requirement), and Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 901 F.2d 404,
433 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding no continuity where an enterprise consisting of an airline
pilots' union, the union negotiator, and the airline employer "briefly flourished and
faded").
214 See supra Part III.A.
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While the spurning of civil RICO plaintiffs based on a continuity
requirement is largely the province of the Fifth Circuit, other courts
of appeals, following the spirit of the Fifth Circuit, applied other enterprise restrictions to bar the door to civil RICO plaintiffs. In a
nearly textbook application of Bledsoe, the Seventh Circuit in Jennings
v. Emry began to restrict civil RICO association-in-fact enterprises. 215
The plaintiff chiropractors had alleged that the defendant law enforcement personnel and medical organizations associated together
to "persecute" the defendants and drive them out of practice. 216 The
court thought that while the plaintiffs may have told a good "story,"
they did not properly allege an enterprise since "nothing [in the complaint] indicat[ed] a command structure separate and distinct from
the government offices." 2 17 However, in Masters,2 18 a criminal case decided after Jennings,. the Seventh Circuit was not concerned that its
interpretation of the decisionmaking-structure requirement, given
similar facts, was completely different.2 1 9
This civil-criminal dichotomy in the interpretation of the RICO
association-in-fact enterprise provision was notjust a problem with the
Seventh Circuit, however. Following Jennings, the Eighth Circuit carried over its Bledsoe restrictions to the civil context in Stephens, Inc. v.
Gelderman, Inc., 2 2 0 but in the process of doing so gave those restrictions a new spin. In Stephens, one of the plaintiffs senior officers had
exploited his control over one of the plaintiffs commodity trading
accounts with the defendant to enrich his own account with the defendant through the help of the defendant's employees. 22 1 The plaintiff
alleged an association-in-fact enterprise consisting of its senior officer,
the defendant commodities merchant, and the defendant's employees
who aided the plaintiffs senior officer.2 22 The court, however, held
that the alleged enterprise had no structure independent of the alleged racketeering activity because the legitimate activities the members of the group carried on "were not in furtherance of the common
or shared purpose of the enterprise," 2 23 thus "clarifying" its holding in
215 910 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir. 1990).
216 Id. at 1436-37.
217 Id. at 1440 n.14.
218 See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
219 See Hartz v. Friedman, 919 F.2d 469, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1990) (doubting the
existence of an enterprise where the plaintiffs alleged that three attorneys and their
law firms associated in fact together to deprive the plaintiffs of their medical malpractice action).
220 962 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1992).

221 Id. at 810-11.
222 Id. at 815.
223

Id. at 816.
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819

Lemm. 224 However, if the Stephens court would have framed the common purpose of the alleged enterprise in Stephens as broadly as it
framed the common purpose of enterprises in the criminal context 22 5-namely, to mutually profit-then almost any other of the enterprise members' activities outside of the racketeering activity would
have satisfied the distinctness requirement. The Stephens court's unwillingness to do this demonstrated a desire to further limit RICO enterprises to only organized crime.
Just a few years after Stephens, the Ninth Circuit-though previously undecided regarding the adoption of the Bledsoe requirements-embraced the "organized crime myth" and followed the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits in restricting civil RICO association-infact enterprises. Chang v. Chen 22 6 marked the Ninth Circuit's first
foray into limiting civil RICO enterprises. In Chang, the defendants
ran a real estate scam whereby two of the defendants would secure an
option to buy land and then enter into a first escrow to purchase the
property.2 27 Then, defendant Eddie Lin would solicit another unsuspecting buyer and, after making fraudulent representations to induce
the buyer to buy the property from the other defendants, would open
up a second escrow and get the potential buyer to make a nonrefundable deposit into the second escrow without informing them about
228
The defendants then divided
the existence of the previous escrow.
229
At first
and pocketed the profit from the nonrefundable deposits.
perenterprise
alleged
the
of
member
each
glance these facts-that
activity,
formed the same functions in each instance of racketeering
that the defendants would give Eddie Lin the green light to solicit
prospective buyers, and that the defendants divided the profits from
the nonrefundable deposits 23 0-obviously showed a "partnership in
crime" and therefore should have constituted an association-in-fact
enterprise. Despite the facts of this involved scheme, however, the
court held that the plaintiffs had not shown structure "separate and
apart from the predicate acts to distribute the proceeds of the transactions" because they had not alleged any activity conducted by the defendants besides the fraudulent transactions, nor any allegations of
224 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
225 See, e.g., United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 856-57 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding a common purpose to buy, sell, and otherwise deal and conceal narcotics and
dangerous drugs).
226 80 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1996).
227 Id. at 1296.

228
229
230

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300.
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some overarching management entity. 23' While this holding is at least

consistent with the Ninth Circuit's dicta in the criminal case United
States v. DeRosa,232 it is entirely at odds with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the distinctness requirement in another RICO criminal
case, United States v. Blinder.23 3 Insofar as Blinder can be read to allow
the plaintiff to satisfy the distinctness requirement by showing that
one member of the association in fact has legitimate activities apart
from the racketeering acts, the Chang plaintiffs should have satisfied
the Blinder version of the distinctness test because the defendant Eddie Lin was involved in the legitimate activities of his real estate
agency 234 as well as the racketeering activity. Unfortunately, the Ninth

Circuit-chomping at the bit to limit civil RICO-did not even consider Blinder.
Two further civil RICO association-in-fact cases demonstrated the
extent of the Ninth Circuit's desire to limit civil RICO enterprises.
Both cases, like Chang v. Chen, involved the court applying the Ninth
Circuit's distinctness requirement to find the plaintiffs enterprise allegations insufficient. In Simon v. Value BehavioralHealth, Inc.,235 the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, a large number of health insurance companies, agents, trade groups, and employee benefit plans,
fraudulently denied health benefit claims and then invested the proceeds to develop a group of preferred medical providers. 23 6 Following Chang, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts
suggesting the existence of an enterprise since the plaintiffs "complaint alleged no more than that appellees collaborated to defraud
health plan beneficiaries." 237 According to the court, the plaintiff did
not allege a hierarchy or decisionmaking structure that guided the
enterprise and was distinct from the racketeering acts. 2 38 Likewise,
the Ninth Circuit in Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc. 239 held that the plaintiff

had not properly alleged an enterprise for the same reasons as the
231
See id.
232 Recall that DeRosa required enterprise activities different from the predicate
acts of racketeering. See supra note 160.
233 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Chang court did
not cite Blinder at all in its opinion.
234 Indeed, those legitimate activities were a necessary cover for the real estate
scam, or else Eddie Lin would have had no credibility with which to lure in potential
buyers.
235 208 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2000).
236 Id. at 1080.
237 Id. at 1083.
238 Id.
239 348 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Simon court.2 4 Because the billing fraud allegedly perpetrated by the
defendant credit card companies and the card-issuing bank represented just a "normal credit card transaction" between the defendants, Citibank (the card-issuing bank), and the plaintiff, the plaintiff
did not allege "that Defendants and Citibank have established a system of making decisions in furtherance of their alleged criminal activpractices."2 4'
ities, independent from their respective regular business
Both of these cases present an affront to the correct interpretation of
RICO's association-in-fact provision, as RICO contains no requirement for a decisionmaking structure or enterprise activities apart
from the racketeering acts. Such an interpretation of the enterprise
RICO
provision also flies in the face of the congressional directive that
242
purposes."
"be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
The growing disparity between civil and criminal association-infact cases found further demonstration in the Sixth Circuit's decision
in VanDenBroeck v. Commonpoint Mortgage C0.243 In a factual situation
similar to Wagh, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant mortgage
company committed a pattern of fraud by associating with secondary
lenders, procuring a loan for the plaintiffs at a higher interest rate
than the market offered, and then selling the plaintiffs loan to the
secondary lenders for a fee based on the difference between the defendant's loan rate and the secondary lender's rate for the same
loan. 2 44 The Sixth Circuit said that this did not satisfy the enterprise
requirement because the plaintiffs did not show "some minimal level
of organizational structure between the entities involved," or "evi24 5
The Sixth Circuit, however, must have fordence of a hierarchy."
gotten its holding in Quoad, where for criminal RICO cases they
rejected the argument that the plaintiff had to show more than just
246
By
the racketeering acts to prove the existence of the enterprise.
structure,"
"organizational
and
hierarchy"
a
of
asking for "evidence
the Sixth Circuit set a higher standard for association-in-fact enterprises in civil RICO cases than in criminal RICO cases.
Finally, the latest and perhaps most devastating twist in the common theme of restricting civil RICO association-in-fact enterprises
Id. at 1112.
241 Id. (quoting Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc., No. CO1-01711TEH, 2002 WL 257846,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2002)).
242 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (1970).
243 210 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000).
244 Id. at 699.
245 Id. at 699-700.
246 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
240
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came from the Seventh Circuit in Baker v. IBP, InC. 2 4 7 In Baker the
Seventh Circuit rejected the claim that a manufacturing plant formed
an association-in-fact enterprise with immigrant welfare organizations
in order to smuggle in illegal aliens to work at the plant. 248 In doing
so, the Seventh Circuit claimed no common purpose animated the
enterprise as a whole: "IBP [the manufacturer] wants to pay lower
wages [while] the Chinese Mutual Aid Association [one of the immigrant welfare organizations] wants to assist members of its ethnic
group. These are divergent goals." 249 Such an understanding of
"common purpose" was never hinted at or applied
in the criminal
context. There, all the government needed to show was a common
purpose to commit the racketeering activity. 25 0 No court inquired as
Baker did into whether members of an alleged association-in-fact criminal enterprise might have different goals, analyzing whether, say,
criminal X committed the bank robbery because he wanted to buy a
new Porsche, or whether criminal Y robbed the bank because he
needed to feed his family. The Baker court never considered that in
criminal RICO cases the common goal of the enterprise and the personal goals of the conspirators often diverge. 2 5 1
Ironically, while the purpose of the Seventh Circuit in Baker may
have been to try to further limit civil RICO, the interpretation it used
threatens to swallow what everyone agrees is the basic purpose of
RICO: attacking mob family-type organizations. If a court were ever to
apply such a requirement to a mafia family RICO prosecution, the
prosecutor would have a difficult time alleging an association-in-fact
enterprise. Many of the family members would certainly have different goals: for example, one underboss's goal of becoming the family

247
248
249

357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 687, 691.
Id. at 691.

250 Recall that something as general as "monetary profit" sufficed in the criminal
context to satisfy "common purpose." See, e.g., United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227,
1244 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding the common purpose of economic gain); United States
v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the existence of an internal
war in the Columbo crime family, the alleged enterprise, did not negate a finding of a
"common purpose"); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 651-52 (9th
Cir. 1988)
(finding the common purpose of defrauding an insurance company through repeated acts of arson); United States v. Tillet, 763 F.2d 628, 631 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding the common purpose of making money off of the illegal trafficking of marijuana).
251
See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding
that while only a small subset of the members of a religious cult committed racketeering acts, the entire cult could properly constitute the association-in-fact enterprise).
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leader is different and inconsistent with another's goal of doing the
25 2
same.
From Shaffer to Baker, then, courts have either applied the old
limitations developed in criminal RICO cases with a novel and brutal
vigor, or created entirely new rules not applied previously in criminal
RICO cases in order to restrict civil RICO cases. Moreover, this disturbing trend has shown no sign of abating, as recent cases such Baker,
Wagh, and VanDenBroeck attest to the commitment of federal courts to
restrict association-in-fact enterprises. Worse, these cases apply restrictions that run counter to the text and legislative history of RICO and
should not even exist, much less be inconsistently applied in a harsher
manner in civil RICO cases than in criminal RICO cases. Unless
courts start critically re-examining where their association-in-fact
caselaw is going, their decisions threaten to run so far afield from the
statute that RICO's association-in-fact provision will become a judicial-and cease to be a legislative-enactment.
CONCLUSION

Federal courts are finding a way to interpret the same statutory
enterprise definition two different ways, depending on the names
typed on the case caption. Perhaps, given the correct interpretation
of RICO's enterprise provision, the scope of civil RICO becomes
frighteningly broad and unmanageable. Indeed, the author of this
Note throughout the writing process found himself somewhat
shocked at the nearly boundless nature of the enterprise provision.
Yet, given the above discussion of Congress's understanding of what it
was doing when it passed RICO, 2 5 3 combined with careful evaluation
54
of the text of the enterprise provision, 2 one cannot in good conscience say that such an interpretation is not the law and should not
control the actions of federal courts regarding association-in-fact enterprises. Any interpretation of RICO's association-in-fact enterprise
contrary to the will of Congress and the text of the statute is simply
illegitimate, no matter what good intentions motivated such an interpretation. If we truly have faith in the operation of our democratic
republic, the remedy to such a perceived malady must be found in
Congress, not the courts. In the end, even in seemingly minor matters such as the proper interpretation of the RICO association-in-fact
252

See Orena, 32 F.3d at 710 (holding that the existence of an internal war in the

Columbo crime family, the alleged enterprise, did not negate a finding of a "common

purpose").
253 See supra Part I.B.
254 See supra Part I.A.
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enterprise, our judges must avoid the "eternal temptation,"2

[VOL. 80:2

55

accept

results they do not like, and interpret the law in accord with its text
and purposes.
While almost twenty-five years have passed since United States v.
Turkette and nearly thirty-five years since the passage of RICO, it is
never too late for federal courts to change course, critically examine
their association-in-fact case law, and attempt to bring uniformity to
their association-in-fact jurisprudence across criminal and civil RICO
caselaw. Federal courts should also purge their case law of any restrictions on association-in-fact enterprises not in accord with the statute.
Specifically, courts should not apply any hierarchy or decisionmakingstructure requirement, distinct structure apart from the racketeeringacts requirement, continuity requirement, or common-purpose requirement beyond the common purpose to form an ongoing organization to commit the predicate acts. By applying RICO to really
prohibit "associations in fact" that engage in racketeering activity-as
the statute intended-courts will not only be keeping within their role
in our democratic republic, but will also put the proper pressure on
Congress to do its job, too, if RICO association-in-fact cases threaten
to get out of control. Thus, our government will be operating as it is
supposed to, and that is a very good thing.
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